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The question presented by both cases is, Where 
parties to a divorce action, after entry of an inter-
locutory decree of divorce but before the decree by 
its terms or under the language of the statute becomes 
final, resume marital relationship and conjugal co-
habitation with the express intention of being and 
living together as husband and wife, are they or 
either of them entitled to have the interlocutory de-
cree vacated and set aside on proper petition filed 
after the six months' period? And in the Johnson 
case, is the wife entitled to that relief under those 
similar circumstances where the parties prior to the 
eXJpiration of the six months' period stipulated -ln 
writing that the decree be set aside- and vacated? 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ALICE L. ,,~OOD, 
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, I 
vs. . 
WAYNE "\VEBSTER WOOD, I 
DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT. 
NORINE ~f. JOHNSON, I 
DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT. ( 
ORLYN JOH~;~N, ·. ~ 
DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
S1'_._\'rEJIE0J'T OF 'rHE CASES AND F A_C'rS 
These t""o cases haYe been consolidated for the pur-
l lOHe of this brief. The facts are practically the same and 
the point of lR\V involved is identical. · · 
Each case involves an app.eal from an order .denying 
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a petition to set aside and vacate an interlocutory decree 
of di votce. The orders ".,.ere entered by the District Court 
of the Fifth ,Judiciall)istrict of the State of Utah, in and 
for Iron County, Utah, lion. Will If. IIoyt, Judge. 
Alice L. "\Vood and 'Vayne '\Vebster \Vood \vere mar-
tied in 1941, and there is one child as the issue of the 
matriage. 1farital difficulties arose and on October, 
1946, the 'vife filed a divorce complaint. (Complaint, 
.A.bs. 1). On February 3rd, 1947, the trial court entered 
its interlocutory decree of divorce. (Decree, .A.bs. 40). 
Thereafter, ~.nd before the said decree might, by its terms 
become final, a reconciliation \Vas effected. The parties 
commenced living together a.s and 'vith the express inten-
tion of being man and 'vife, and commenced conjugal co-
habitation 'vhich continued to the time of hearing on· the 
petition of both parties to have the said interlocutory 
decree of divorce set aside and vacated. ( Abs. 45). Par-
enthetically, it is stated that such conjugal cohabitation 
has continued to the present time. No final decree of 
divorce \vas ever made or entered by the Court. After 
the six montlu~' period from the entry of the said inter-
locutory deeree the parties filed the petition mentioned 
to have the interlocutory de~1·e~ set aside and vacated. 
rrhe trial court found the above to be the facts, and 
thereupon concluded and ordered as follows ( Abs. 47-48:) 
'• That the decree of divorce in this cause has 
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become final and is not now subject to being set 
aside or vacated. 
''That this court does not have jurisdiction to 
set aside an interlocutory decree of divorce where 
application SQ to do is not made until after it has 
become fhu'l under the terms of the statute; 
"That the verified petition of plaintiff and de· 
fendant to set aside and vacate the said interlocu-
tory decree and to dismiss the \\rithin entitled cause 
should be denied. 
''NO\V THEREFORE, it is HEREBY OR-
:OERED, ADJUDGED and DECR.EED that the 
petition of plaintiff and defendant to set aside and 
vacate the said interlocutory decree and to dismiss 
the 'vithin entitled cause be, and the same is hereby 
denied.'' 
The f~rtcts, and the decision of the trial court, in the 
,Johnson case are 'veil stated in the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of La" ... , aJtd Order, and are as follo,vs ( A.bs. 
24-25-26, J ohn.son case): 
'' 1. That the said plaintiff and defendant inter-
married on the 7th day of June, 1945, and that there 
is one child born as the issue of the said marriage, 
to-·wit, Denise Johnson, of the age of t"ro years. 
"2. That on the 6th day of October, 1947, the 
plaintiff commenced an action for divorce in this 
court against the said defendant and after due pro-
ceedings had the court on the 4th day of December, 
1947, made and entered its inter~ocutory decree of 
divorce in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendant, a'varding custody of the minor child to the 
plaintiff; 
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'' 3. That thereafter. and on the 17th day of De-
cember, 1947,. as testified to by the plaintiff, the 
plaintiff at the request of the defendant, went to 
visit him at ·Milfo':rd, in Beaver County, Utah, where 
he was then living, and the parties agreed to become 
reconciled and to- resume their relations as husband 
and wife, and that thereupon the said parties did 
resume their marital relations under an agreement, 
mutually entered into and with the mutual under-
standing they sb.ould remain as husband and wife 
and that the divorce decree should be set aside; 
"4. That the parties lived together as husband 
and wife for a few day and until the defendant 
joined the United States Navy; 
"5. That upon joining the United States Navy 
the defendant arranged for an allotment for . the 
plaintiff, as· his wife, declaring her to be his wife, 
and that the plaintiff has been rece~ving allotment 
checks as the wife of defendan~; 
'' 6. That prior to the expiration of six months 
from and after the date of entry of the interlocutory 
decree the pl~intiff and defendant entered into a 
written stipulation providing that the decree should 
be set aside, a copy of which stipulation was intro-
duced in evidence by the plaintiff and filed on July 
27, 1948, at the time of the hearing of petition to set 
aside the interlocutory decree, 'and a copy of which 
stipulation is attached hereto and made a part of 
these findings a~d marked exhibit 'A'; 
'' 7. That· the said defendant, after joining the 
United States Navy,.has been absent from the Unit-
ed States, and ·has neve.r· had an ·opportunity to re-
turn, but that he has frequently corresponded with 
the defendant, addressing her as his wife on all 
such occasions ; 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
'' 8. No motion or application was made to the 
court for setting aside the divorce decree, other than 
the filing of the petition as aforesaid, until July 
27th, 19-!H, \Yhen the hearing on the said petition was 
had, nor \Yas the court prior to the filing of said 
petition informed or given notice that the parties 
had become reconciled or resumed th~ir marital re-
lations; 
'• 9. No final decree "ras ever signed or entered. 
''10. The November, 1947, term of the District 
Court of Iron County, Utah, ended December 31st, 
1947; the January, 1948, term ended April lOth, 
1948; the April, 1948, term was in progress at the 
time the motion was submitted and the said hearing 
had, and had not ended at the time this Court de-
termined the matter of said petition and made its 
decision denying the same, so that the term of court 
during \Vhich the interlocutory decree became final 
according to the terms of said decree, by the provi-
sions of the statute had not ended at the time the 
court made its decision denying the said petition. 
'' 11. That through inadvertence and neglect 
the plaintiff failed and neglected to place the_ written 
stipulation in the hands of her attorneys, and failed 
to instruct them to file a petition on behalf of plain-
tiff and defendant to dismiss said action and set 
aside the interlocutory decree, until the expiration 
of more than six months from and after the date of 
its entry, and tha~ the parties were not sure that 
such action would be necessary in order that such 
divorce decree be prevented from becoming final, 
since they had previously agreed that they should 
remain as husband and wife and had become recon-
ciled and resumed their marital relations as such.'' 
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And as conclusions of law from the foregoing find-
ings of fact, the Court now finds : 
'' 1. That the decree of divorce in this cause has 
become final and is not rio\v subject to being set 
aside or vacated; 
'' 2. · That this court does not have. jurisdiction 
to set aside an interlocutory decree of divorce where 
application so to do is not made until after it has 
become final under the terms of the statute; 
'' 3. That the petition of plaintiff to set aside 
and vacate the said interlocutory decree and to dis-
miss the within entitled action should be denied. 
"NOW THEREFORE-by reason of the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law as aforesaid, and 
pursuant thereto and in accordance therewith-
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and DECREED 
that the petition of plaintiff to set aside and vacate 
the said interlocutory decree and to dismiss the 
within entitled cause be, and the same is hereby 
denied.'' 
The only difference in the facts of the two cases is 
this : In the 'V ood case the parties joined in the petition 
to set aside the interlocutory decree after the expiration 
of the six months' p.eriod, i.e., took no affirmative legal 
steps to set the decree aside. In the ,Johnson case, prior 
to the expiration of the six months' period, the parties 
signed a stipulation that the decree should be set aside 
but neglected to file the stipulation or their petition to 
set aside and vacate the said decree until the expiration 
of the six months' period. 
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In each case, by joining in the petition or by stipula-
tion, the husband and ~rife are in accord in desiring- that 
the interlocutory decree of divorce be set aside, althoug-h 
on the record the parties are designated as appellants 
and respondents. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED ON 
In each case the parties urge that the trial court, con-
trary to its conclusions and orders,-has jurisdiction to so 
set aside and Yacate the interlocutory decree, and in fact~ 
it is his clear duty so to do, and that the trial court erred 
in denying the petitions to set aside and vacate the re-
spective interlocutory decrees of divorce. 
ARGUMENT 
The questions involved in these cases may be suc-
cinctly stated as follows : 
The question presented by both cases is, Where par-
ties to a divorce action, after entry of an interlocutory 
decree of divorce but before the decree by its terms or 
under the language of the statute becomes final, resume 
marital relationship and conjugal cohabitation '\\rith the 
express intention of being and living together as husband 
and 'vife, are they or either of them entitled to have the 
interlocutory decree vacated and set aside on proper peti-
tion filed after the six months ,-period, And in the John-
son case, is the wife entitled to that relief under those 
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similar circumstances where the parties prior to the ex-
piration of the six months' period stipulated in writing 
that the decree be set aside and vacated? 
That the courts have the inherent power to set aside 
djvorce decrees where the parties have resumed the mar-
ital relation before the interlocutory decree becomes final 
is 'veil settled. This is true regardless of whether, under 
the statutes, the court enters what is commonly termed 
a final decree or whether the decree by its own terms or 
under the language of the statute becomes final on the 
expiration of a. prescribed period of time. 
See Olson v. Superior Court (Cal), 165 Pacific 706, 
wherein the Court so held; and stating it to be one of 
the purposes of the la,v, and one of the purposes of the 
waiting period before a divorce becomes final, to give the 
spouses a chance to effect a reconciliation 'vhich the la'v 
al,vays favors. The Court said that from its very nature 
the interlocutory decree can only operate upon facts exist-
ing do\vn to the time it is given, that ·a decree could not 
be forced upon blameless and nonconsenting parties after 
such a reconciliation, and that a court of equity has with-
out expres.s authorization the po,ver to recognize condon-
ations and reconciliations and to do justice to litigants as 
may be demanded by such events in their lives as has 
arisen subsequent to the entry of the interlocutory decree 
and before the expiration of the fixed period when the 
interlocutory decree would otherwise become final.· 
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See also Nelson r. Nelson (Cal), 60 Pacific (2d) 982. 
While both of the above cases refer to statutes under 
which one of the parties must go before the court and 
procure an actual "final decree," "'l'e ·will later cite cases 
holding to the same effect under statutes similar or ident-
ical to Utah statute. 
The policy of the la'v has been determined by this 
Honorable Court in Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commis-
s·ion, 82 Utah 179, 22 Pacific (2d) 104 , as follows: 
''The reasons given for the liberal use of powers 
by courts with respect to setting aside of divorce 
decrees is in harmony with enlightened public senti-
ment and the time-honored policy of the law which 
favors a continuance of marriage relations and the 
reconciliation of the parties where possible even 
after suit brought or decree entered. Githins v. 
Githens, supra: Olson v. Superior Ct. of Merced 
County, 175 Cal250, 165 P. 706, 1 A. L. R. 1589. Sim-
ilar reasons support the exercise of liberal powers 
by the courts of this state under our statute in sus-
pending or extending the date of finality after an 
interlo~utory decree is entered. In Spencer v. 
Clark, supra, the court said: 'The purpose of the 
statute is to prevent speedy divorces, to give ample 
time for reflection and reconciliation, and to pre-
vent imposition upon the court. It therefore pro-
vides for a procedure without formalities, and an 
application by any party, whether interested or not.' 
' ' The law seems to be settled that a court has 
no power to set aside or vacate a judgment not void 
on its face, unless the motion is made within the 
time fixed by Section 6619. Lees v. Freeman, 19 
.. 
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Utah 481, 57 P.- 411; Dell v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. 
App. 436, 200 P. 85. An exception to this rule is 
_made by some courts where the action is for divorce 
and the motion is made by both parties, in the ab~ 
sence of intervening rights by third parties. Gith-
ens v. Githens, 78 Colo. 102, 235 P. 1023, 43 A. L. R. 
547. We need not go to the extent of holding as did 
the court in Githens v. Githens that the court which. 
granted the divorce has inherent power at any time 
after the decree is rendered to set aside and annul 
the decree on application of both parties where the 
rights of only the parties themselves are concerned 
-or affected thereby, for the reason that here the 
application was made and decree set ~side and the 
action dismissed within the time provided by Sec~ 
tion 6619. '' 
While in the Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission 
case cited, this Court did not go so far as to hold with the 
Givens v. Githens case therein cited, it did broadly indi-
cate that such would have been the holding if such ruling 
had been necessary to a decision. 
That case of Githens v. Githens (Colo), 239 Pacific 
1023, is a case widely cited by courts of appellate juris~ 
diction, and is flatly in point. After the entry of the inter-
locutory decree of divorce the parties in the Githens case 
became reconciled, and fourteen years later both parties 
petitioned to have the interlocutory decree annulled, and 
this was done. I_jater the husband alone petitioned to 
vacate the annulling decree, which the Colorado Supreme 
Court refused to do. Because the parties to these appeals 
• 
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-
no'v before this Court believe that the Githens case is de-
cisive, they quote at length therefrom: 
''The only objection urged by plaintiff in error 
to the judgment under review is that, since the 
county court is governed by Section 81 of our Code 
of Chril Procedure it had thereunder no jurisdiction 
to reopen or vacate this decree unless the applica-
tion therefor 'vas made 'vithin the period of six 
months after the adjournment of the term, this ap-
plication not having been made within the time. If 
the Code provision is applicable to divorce actions, 
we think the contention not tenable. At the com-
mon la,v, as adopted by us, courts of law and equity 
in England did not have jurisdiction in divorce 
cases. The ecclesiastical courts alone had such 
po,ver. The doctrine there \Vas that after a decree 
of divorce was rendered reconciliation and living 
together as husband and wife by the parties of it-
self nullified the divorce decree. -rn Barrere v. 
BaT-rere, 4 .Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 187, Chancellor Kent, 
in an able opinion, refers to the practice in the ec-
clesiastical courts in England and other countries. 
The Barrere Case _,vas one for separation from bed 
and board forever or for a limited time. The learned 
chancellor decided that, inasmuch as opportunity 
should be left open for reconciliation, the proper 
course is to declare the separation perpetual with 
the po\ver reserved to the parties to come together 
under sanction of the court 'vhenever they should 
find it to be their mutual and voluntary disposition. 
It appears from the opinion in ,Jones v. Jones (N.J. 
Ch.) 29 A .. 502, that this decision of Chancellor Kent 
led to the enactment of the New York statute in 
keeping with his suggestion, and the decisions of 
New York, as of New Jersey, and generally in our 
states, now are that mere reconciliation of the par-
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ties does not annul the judgment of separation or 
divorce, but that a decree annulling the same may 
be entered upon the cpnsent of the parties, and when 
so rendered the marital rights of the parties are re-
stored. 
' 'The state's of the Union generally encourage 
the permanency and continuity of the marital rela-
tion. They look with disfavor upon divorces. No 
decree of divorce is maintainable except upon one 
or more of the statutory grounds. In the case be-
fore us the parties personally appeared in court and 
joined in the application to have the absolute decree 
of divorce theretofore entered set aside and held 
for naught. It was not against, but in consonance 
with, public policy to grant such relief. The parties 
in their written application expressly say that they 
had never recognized the decree of divorce but had 
been and were living together as husband and wife 
from the time of its rendition. No rights of third 
persons are involved. While vve have no statute 
upon the subject-at least our attention is not called 
to any-the court had inherent jurisdiction at any 
time after the decree was rendered, and where only 
the rights of the parties themselves are concerned, 
to set aside and annul this decree of divorce, when 
the parties, as here, joined in the written request 
therefor. Indeed, the acts and conduct of the par-
tie·s, according to their own statement in legal effect, 
was a common law marriage entered into after the 
decree of divorce was granted.'' 
Appellants .to this appeal call particular attention 
that the Colorado statute (Chapter 56, S.ection 13) pro-
vides as follows: 
"If, however, a divorce ought to be granted, the 
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court shall enter an interlocutory decree, providing 
that the parties to such action shall be divorced six 
( 6) months after the date of such interlocutory de-
cree. D11ring that six ( 6) months period the parties 
shall not be divorced and neither party shall con-
tract another marriage during sueh period. During 
such period the court may, upon motion or petition 
of either party to the action, or upon its own motion, 
for g·ood cause sho'vn _after a hearing·, set aside such 
interlocutory decree. Such interlocutory decree 
such be a final order as of the date of its entry." 
In other words, the Colorado statute is similar in 
effect to Sections 40-3-6 and 40-3-7, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, which provides as follows: 
'' 40-3-6. Interlocutory Decree. 
''If E!fter the hearing of any divorce cause the 
court is of the opinion that the divorce ought to be 
granted to either person, a decree shall be entered 
granting to such person a divorce; but the decree 
shall specifically provide that it shall not become 
absolute until the expiration of six months from the 
date of its entry. 
''40-3-7. When Decree Becomes Absolute. 
''The decree of divorce shall become absolute 
at the expiration of six months from the entry there-
of, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review 
are pending, or the court before the expiration of 
said period for sufficient cause upon its own motion 
or upon the application of any person, whether in-
terested or not, other,vise orders.'' 
A still later Colorado case (and appellants reiterate 
that the Colorado statute is similar in effect to our own, 
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is that of .Jordan v. Jordon (Colo), 96 Pacific (2d) 13. 
Under facts similar to the cases at bar, the Court held: 
''The question is, must decrees of the nature 
here, wholly disregarded by the parties, remain sac-
rosant nevertheless 1 The only office of such decree 
is to make judicially evident the fact that the mar-
riage relation between the parties, although once 
obtaining, no longer exists. 'Vhere the parties, as 
here, continue their 1narriage notwithstanding the 
divorce, upon what rule or reasonable hypothesis 
· shQuld decrees erroneously determining otherwise 
remain of record 1 \V e think of none. On the con-
trary, as 've conceive, public policy demands that 
the parties to such a situation be relegated to the 
status resulting from their formal ma~riage, and 
'vhich, as now appears, their alleged short-comings 
did not rupture nor decrees of court interrupt That 
"?hich seems desirable procedure is best effectuated 
by vacating the decrees, as \Vas done by the trial 
eourt. See Githe·ns v. Githens, 78 Colo. 102, 239 P. 
1023, 43 ~J\. L. R. 547.'' 
\V e are impressed by the statetnent of the Court in 
the ,Jordan case to the effect that 'vhere the parties con-
tinue their marriage not,vithstauding the interlocutory 
decree of divorce, the divorce decree erroneously deter-
mining other,vise should not remain of record. Appellants 
add that a Court should nevet recognize a decree that not 
only erroneously determines a marriage to be nonexistent 
'vhich is actually existent, but should never recognize a 
decree that the parties themselves neither recognize nor 
'vish of record. 
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It is noted that the cases at bar are cases wherein all 
of the parties seek by petition, or by stipulation, to have 
the decree annulled. In most litig·ated_ cases only one of 
the parties contends that the decree should be annulled, 
and the adverse party contends that the decree should 
remain as a finality. It 'vill also be observed that no 
rights of third persons intervene in either of the cases at 
bar, and no property rights of the parties themselves or 
of third persons are involved. 
The latest case flatly in point is that of Shinn v. 
Shinn, 148 Nebraska 832, decided in 1947. Again the 
statute is similar to our O"\\--n, to-wit: 
''A decree of divorce shall not become final or 
operative until six months after trial and decision, 
except for the purpose of review by appeal, and for 
such purpo_se only the d~cree shall be treated as a 
final order as soon as rendered; Provided, if appeal 
shall have been instituted within three months, such 
decree shall not become final until sue!\ proceedings 
are finally determined. If no such proceedings have 
been instituted, the district court may, at any time 
within said six months, vacate or modify its decree, 
but if such decree shall not have been vacated or 
modified;· unless proceedings are then pending with 
that end in view, the original decree shall at the 
expiration of six months become final without any 
further action of the court. Section 42-340, R. S .. 
1943,. Nebraska.'' 
In the Shinn case, which was one of the first impres-
sion before that Court, after an exhaustive review of the 
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authorities, the Court held that even though application 
to have the interlocutory decree of divorce annulled was 
made and filed after the waiting period, if the parties 
had resumed the marital relationship prior thereto, the 
Court must annul the decree. 
Appellants believe that· the Shinn case is conclusive 
o.f the question before this Court and we cite at length: 
'' 'The problem is one of whether the parties 
have become so reconciled as to have fully resumed 
relations as man and wife with- the intention that 
they be permanent, obviating the necessity or desire 
for termination of the marriage and ma:king its con-
tinnance a matter of social propriety and probable 
success. The factors involved are less legal than 
social, and such few decisions as there are only em-
phasize the incongruity of seeking to place divorce 
suits on the same plane as those to quiet title or 
replevin a chattel for unpaid installments of the 
purchase price. ' 
''The record in the instant case sho"\vs a con-
tinuous living together in the relationship of hus-
band and wife by the plaintiff and defendant from 
September 12, 1941, to May 31, 1945. We are con-
vinced that uncfer the circumstances and the evi-
dence in this case it- "\Vas the plaintiff's duty, when 
he condoned the misconduct of his wife upon which 
he obtained the decree of divorce and the parties 
reconciled their differences, to have informed the 
district court accordingly. The reconciliation hav-
ing occurred prior to the decree of divorce becom-
ing absolute, the plaintiff's failure to so notify the 
court constituted a fraud perpetrated by him on the 
court. We further believe that had the rourt known 
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the full circumstances it would, in the exercise of 
its sound discretion, have set aside and vacated the 
decree of diYorce obtained on April 14, 1941, by the 
plaintiff. 
''The cases of Carp~nter v. Carpenter, supra, 
and Colick v. Coliek, supra, are cited by the plaintiff 
on the theory that since the decree of divorce be-
comes absolute at the expiration of six months 
'vithout further action of the court, the resumption 
of marital relations within that period does not pre-
vent the decree from becoming final or operative at 
the expiration thereof ; that the proceedings to va-
cate the decree of divorce within six months period 
from the rendition thereof is not ex parte in nature, 
and notice must be given to the other party to en,. 
able such party to be heard if desired. In the in-
stant case no such notice ~,was given the defendant, 
and plaintiff contends that she is bound to know 
the law on the subject. 
'' W ~ find nothing in the foregoing cases that, 
applied to the circumstances and the evidence in the 
case at bar, would 11pset the substantive law of this 
state and deny the right of a party to resort to a 
court of equity to vacate a decree of divorce obtained 
against such party by fraud, after. the divorce be-
comes absolute. Nor do we find anything in the 
cited cases that would bar a court of equity from 
vacating a decree of divorce when the facts disclose 
a fraud was perpetrated on the court. Courts are 
protected by law when such instances occur. Recon-
ciliation of the parties 'vas not involved in the t'vo 
cited cases. 
·''Where parties, ·as here, continue their mar-
riage and start to do so before the decree or' divorce 
becomes absolute, or in other words notwithstand-
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ing the divorce, upon what rule or reasonable 
hypothesis should decrees erroneously determining. 
otherwise remain of record 1 We think of none. In 
_this con:qection, see Jordan v. Jordan, 105 Colo. 171, 
96 P. 2d 13; Githens v. Githens, 78 Colo. 102, 239 P. 
1023, 43 ·A. I~. R. 547. To so hold would make a 
farce of judicial procedure and open the door to un-
limited fraud and imposition on innocent an<l trust-
ing persons. The result would be to make the law 
an instrument of oppression and a. trap for the un-
'vary, and often-times would -develop intolerable 
situations involving innocent children and creditors 
in good faith, to say nothing of the parties them .. 
selves, in extricable confusion. Nothing but harm 
would result for all concerned. 
''We conclude, for the reasons given in this 
opinion, that the <;leQree of the district court in 
finding generally in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant should be, and is hereby, re-
versed:: that the decree of divorce procured by the 
plaintiff, against the defendant on April 14, 1941, 
be, and is hereby; set aside and vacated, and the 
district court is directed to enter judgment accord ... 
ingly.'' 
In the Johnson case, at bar, the parties, prior to the 
expir~tion of the six months' period, stipulated in writ-
ing that the interlocutory decree of divorce should be set 
aside and the action dismissed, but it was filed after the 
expiration of the six months' period. Appellant, Norine 
M. Johnson, urges that a court of equity should always 
set aside any decree, divorce or otherwise, taken after the 
parties agree that a decree should not be entered and the 
action should be dismissed. While, from the cases here-
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inbefore cited by appellants, we find that divorce actions 
are treated in a different category than actions for money 
judgments and decrees and the like, even in an action for 
a money judgment, a court of equity in a suitable pro-
ceeding would set aside a judgment taken afte1· the par-
ties had stipulated to a dismissal. Not only would such 
a judgment be a fra.ud upon the adverse party, but a 
fraud on the court.. 
Appellants, and each of them, respectfully submit 
that the orders of the trial court were erroneous and the 
decisions of the trial court should be reversed. 
Respectf,ztlly subm~itted, 
C;LINE, 'WILSON AND CLINE, 
.Attorneys for Appellants. 
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